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Abstract 
 
The position of an item influences its evaluation, with research consistently finding that items 
occupying central locations are preferred and have a higher subjective value. The current 
study investigated whether this centre-stage effect (CSE) is a result of bottom-up gaze 
allocation to the central item, and whether it is affected by item valence. Participants (n=50) 
were presented with three images of artistic paintings in a row and asked to choose the image 
they preferred. Eye movements were recorded for a subset of participants (n=22). On each 
trial the three artworks were either similar but different, or were identical and with positive 
valence, or were identical and with negative valence. The results showed a centre-stage 
effect, with artworks in the centre of the row preferred, but only when they were identical and 
of positive valence. Significantly greater gaze allocation to the central and left artwork was 
not mirrored by equivalent increases in preference choices. Regression analyses showed that 
when the artworks were positive and identical the participants’ last fixation predicted 
preference for the central art-work, whereas the fixation duration predicted preference if the 
images were different. Overall the result showed that item valence, rather than level of gaze 
allocation, influences the CSE, which is incompatible with the bottom-up gaze explanation. 
We propose that the centre stage heuristic, which specifies that the best items are in the 
middle, is able to explain these findings and the centre-stage effect.  
 
Keywords: eye tracking, preference, centre-stage effect, art, decision making 
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1. Introduction 
In Western Society a robust social convention is that the person with the highest status will 
often be positioned in the centre a group of people (McArthur, 1981). This relationship 
between the central position and status has surprisingly important implications such as 
influencing how much a person is preferred, their perceived status, and even whether they 
will be given a job. For instance people who hold the belief that “Important people sit in the 
middle” are more likely to give a job to the candidate in the centre of a photograph of five 
potential job candidates (Raghubir & Valenzuela 2006). This ‘center-stage effect’ (CSE) has 
also been found to apply to consumer choices so that when people are presented with a row 
of similar items they show a preference for items in the middle rather than at either end of the 
row (Atalay, Bodur, & Rasolofoarison, 2012; Christenfeld, 1995; Raghubir & Valenzuela, 
2006; Rodway, Schepman, & Lambert, 2012; Shaw & Bergen, 2000; Valenzuela & 
Raghubir, 2009). Therefore it is apparent that not all locations are treated equally, and the 
preference for centrally located people and objects influences decisions in a wide range of 
settings, including consumer choices and the evaluation of people.  
 
Previous work demonstrating a middle preference has tended to use everyday consumer items 
(Christenfeld, 1995) such as pens and chairs (Shaw et al., 2000), packets of chewing gum 
(Valenzuela & Raghubir, 2009), socks (Rodway et al., 2012), or vitamins and cereal bars 
(Atalay et al., 2012). In each of these studies the set of items were selected to be very similar, 
or identical, and have also possessed a neutral or mildly positive valence. As these items may 
not be intrinsically interesting it is possible that when people are forced to choose between 
them they select the middle item as their default option because of indifference toward the 
items, as can occur on some rating scales (see Kulas, Stachowski, & Haynes, 2008). 
Similarly, as proposed by Christenfeld (1995), limited interest in the items may also cause 
participants to expend minimal mental effort on the selection, with the middle item selected 
because it appears to be the easiest option and requires the least thought.   
 
One of the aims of the current study was to test this possibility by investigating whether the 
middle preference generalises to stimuli that may require more cognitive and emotional 
appraisal during their evaluation and selection. Works of art were chosen as stimuli because it 
has been argued that visual art is appraised differently from everyday objects (Cupchik, 
Vartanian, Crawley, & Mikulis, 2009). The former involves complex cognitive and emotional 
responses that are believed to be key processes of the aesthetic evaluation of a work of art, 
but not the processing of everyday objects (Cupchik et al., 2009; Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & 
Augustin, 2004; Leder, 2013). In this study three works of art were presented on each trial 
and participants were asked to select the one that they most preferred. It was reasoned that if 
the middle preference is simply a product of minimal effort when choosing among items with 
little intrinsic value, then it may not be present for works of art which elicit greater in-depth 
cognitive and emotional appraisals. Conversely, if position continues to have an effect it will 
show that the centre-stage effect generalises to aesthetic preferences and that it might not be 
due to the use of everyday items that require minimal cognitive appraisal. 
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A further central aim of the study was to examine the two primary explanations of the centre 
stage effect. One explanation is that it is caused by a ‘center-stage’ decision heuristic that 
specifies that central items are more important and valuable and are therefore to be preferred 
(Raghubir & Valenzuela, 2006; Valenzuela & Raghubir, 2009). Thus, the middle advantage 
arises because the middle location has a special status, carrying implicit assumptions about 
the importance of the object (or person) in the middle of a group (McArthur, 1981; Raghubir 
& Valenzuela, 2006; Valenzuela & Raghubir, 2009).  A second explanation of the CSE is that 
it is due to attentional processes, with greater attention to the central item enhancing 
preference (Shaw et al., 2000).  Evidence exists for both accounts and previous research has 
not convincingly favoured one explanation.  
 
Raghubir and Valenzuela (2006) examined these two explanations of the CSE by examining 
how people’s beliefs about items located in the centre influenced their choices, in addition to 
using indirect measures of attention. They provided a range of evidence in favour of the 
heuristic explanation, with people’s belief that central items are more valuable causing a 
middle preference in a wide range of circumstances. In addition they found that when 
participants chose an item for another person, rather than themselves, it increased the strength 
of the middle preference, which they suggest reflects the meta-cognitive knowledge people 
have about the factors that govern choices in other people. Valenzuela and Rahugbir (2009) 
also predicted that if belief-based mechanisms underlie the middle preference, rather than 
attentional processes, then those beliefs will be affected by additional sources of information 
that strengthen or weaken the middle preference. Their findings were in line with their 
prediction but they obtained no evidence to suggest that greater attention to the middle item 
caused the middle preference. Consequently Raghubir and Valenzuela (2006) concluded that 
metacognitive beliefs about position were necessary and sufficient for the middle preference 
to emerge. 
 
Despite persuasive evidence from Valenzuela and Raghubir’s studies, without directly 
examining gaze behaviour it is difficult to discount the possibility that gaze influences 
location based preferences, independently of the centre stage heuristic. A robust finding in 
the vision literature is that people look first and for longer at the centre of a computer screen, 
or visual scene, than at peripheral items (Bindemann, 2010; Tatler, 2007). As increased 
exposure has been found to increase liking (Zajonc, 1968) the central looking bias could 
underlie the CSE. 
 
Other research has demonstrated that directing gaze to an item, rather than mere exposure to 
an item, is important in enhancing preference (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003).  
The influence of gaze on choice has been explained in terms of a gaze cascade theory 
(Shimojo et al., 2003), which proposes that gaze at preferred items combines with increased 
exposure to create a positive feedback loop (a gaze cascade) as people view items, so that 
preference for a particular item becomes stronger and a choice emerges (Shimojo et al., 2003; 
see also Glaholt & Reingold, 2009; Nittono & Wada, 2009).  
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One study to directly examine the role of attention and the CSE was conducted by Atalay et 
al. (2012) who measured participant’s eye movements while choosing a consumer item from 
a row of similar products. They replicated the CSE with participants showing a preference for 
the middle item.  Participants also showed a central looking bias, with more first looks at the 
central item in the first 500 ms, and also more fixations on a chosen item in the last 500 ms 
before the choice was made.  The increase in fixations on the central item at the start of the 
task did not predict choice of the middle item, whereas gaze allocation to the centre in the last 
500 ms before the choice did predict the central preference. Atalay et al. (2012) explain the 
middle preference in terms of a central gaze cascade effect, with gaze allocated at the central 
item increasing the preference for that item. However, this is only apparent in the 500 ms 
before a choice and is not predicted by the central viewing bias at the start of a trial. Atalay et 
al. (2012) suggest that indirect measures of attention, such as recollection scores or 
visualisability are not be sensitive at detecting actual behaviour, which is why Raghubir and 
Valenzuela (2006) may not have found a relationship between attention and the CSE. 
 
A difficulty with concluding that the CSE is due to a gaze cascade effect is that other research 
has questioned the validity of gaze cascade theory (Glaholt, & Reingold, 2009; Nittono & 
Wada, 2009; see also Orquin & Loose, 2013), as it has been found that exposure duration 
determines preferences rather that eye movements (Bird, Lauwereyns, & Crawford, 2012). 
Moreover, Bird et al. (2012) suggest that eye movements may have no causal role in a 
preference decision and that the relationship between eye movements and choice can be 
explained by greater exposure enhancing preference rather than by the allocation of gaze.  
 
A further difficulty in concluding that the CSE is due to attentional factors is that 
considerable evidence suggests that top-down influences, such as instructions and search 
strategies, can govern the allocation of gaze to relevant stimuli (Orquin & Loose, 2013). 
Therefore, although Atalay et al.’s (2012) results show a link between gaze allocation and 
preference for the central item, it is not possible to conclude that gaze caused the preference, 
as gaze allocation could have been the product of a top-down ‘center-stage’ strategy. It is 
possible that both mechanisms operate and they need not be mutually exclusive. For example, 
a centre-stage heuristic could increase the allocation of gaze to the middle, and the tendency 
to gaze at the middle item could be the mechanism by which preference for that item is 
increased. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the valence of items interact with the effect of 
exposure on preference. For example, Armel, Beaumel and Rangel (2008) found that greater 
attention to appetitive items enhanced preference whereas greater attention to unappetitive 
items reduced preference. Therefore, increased exposure on its own does not increase choice 
(see also Chandon, Hutchinson, Bradlow, & Young, 2009), as it is dependent on the valence 
of an item, showing that gaze duration and choice preference can dissociate. 
 
In the current study eye movements were measured and two manipulations were introduced 
to further examine the relationship between gaze and preference for the middle item.  First, 
the valence of the artworks was manipulated with one category of artworks possessing a 
negative valence and a second category a positive valence. Armel et al.’s (2008) results 
suggest that increased gaze only enhanced preference for positive items and therefore gaze to 
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negative artworks may not result in increased preference. Moreover, no other study has 
examined how the valence of an item influences the CSE but it is possible that the middle 
preference only applies to positive items and not negative items. This is suggested by the 
findings of Rodway et al. (2012) who manipulated the valence of the preference decision, but 
not the valence of the items, by asking participants to select from a row of 5 similar images 
the image they ‘least prefer’ or the one they ‘most prefer’. They found that the middle item 
was only selected more frequently when it was a positive preference selection and not when it 
was a negative preference selection. This indicates that the CSE may only occur for items that 
are desirable or positive rather than items that are undesirable. Importantly, if valence 
influenced the CSE but not gaze behaviour then dissociation between gaze and choice of item 
might emerge. This would enable a clearer understanding of the cause of the centre stage 
effect, pointing to a heuristic explanation rather than an attentional account. 
 
A final manipulation was to vary the type of decision made. As Bar-Hillel (2011) notes, the 
middle preference has been demonstrated most consistently in decision tasks where the items 
are either all identical (e.g. Christenfeld, 1995) or very similar (Shaw et al., 2001; Valenzuela 
& Raghubir, 2009) making the decision different to other selection tasks where all the items 
typically differ on several dimensions. Bar-Hillel (2011) suggests that selecting from 
identical items is a form of ‘picking’, which occurs quite frequently in every-day life, but less 
often than when selecting from items which are all different. This second type of selection 
task is the more typical form of ‘choosing’. In choosing tasks the features of the items largely 
determine which item is chosen and the effect of the central location is diminished but may 
still be apparent. 
 
To investigate whether ‘picking’ and ‘choosing’ a work of art influenced the center-stage 
effect participants were presented with either three identical works of art or three works of art 
that were similar but distinct (see fig 1). It was predicted that there would be a preference for 
middle items but this would be strongest in the picking task, in line with earlier findings. This 
manipulation also enabled an examination of the relationship between looking and choice 
selection. If the pattern of looking at the central items was equivalent in the picking and 
choosing tasks, but the centre stage effect was only present for the picking task, then the 
results could indicate that looking behaviour does not always predict the item chosen. 
 
Irrespective of the valence of the artworks or the type of choice task, based on the central 
viewing bias and the results of Atalay et al. (2012), we expected that participants would tend 
to fixate the central item first and make more fixations to the central item. We hypothesised 
that if the central viewing bias determines the centre-stage effect then there should be a 
positive relationship between the number of fixations on the central artwork and the 
participant’s selection of that artwork. Moreover, if the centre-stage effect is caused by 
looking at the central item in the second (or 500 ms) before the choice is made, or by the first 
look in the selection task (e.g. Atalay et al., 2012; Shimojo et al., 2003; Yagi, Ikoma, & 
Kikuchi, 2009), then this would also be reflected in the eye movement and choice data.  
Conversely, if looking patterns do not cause the centre-stage effect then there should be no 
relationship between looking at the central artwork and choice of that item. In this case the 
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results may provide indirect support for the central preference being determined by a decision 
heuristic rather than by looking behaviour. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Fifty right-handed participants (21 male) were recruited from student population and the 
general public with a mean age of 28 (SD 8.78, range 18 – 56). All procedures were approved 
by the University of East London’s ethics committee. Participants gave written consent to 
participate without pay. Eye tracking data was collected from a subset of 22 participants (7 
male). Eye tracking data from three participants was excluded due to technical problems 
(such as a large number of data loss during the eye tracking recording due to eye-blinks), the 
analysis was conducted with the remaining participants (N = 19)1. All participants had 
normal, or corrected to normal vision.  
 
2.2. Materials 
Contemporary artwork was used as stimuli to allow the systematic manipulation of valence, 
as well as combining symmetrical patterns and faces similar to stimuli used in previous 
studies. Twenty-two contemporary artworks were selected from 15 little known artists. The 
criterion for an artist to be included was that they had sold their work or had publicly 
exhibited. The images were divided into three categories: positive-identical (8 items), 
negative-identical (8 items) and different (6 items) (Figure 1). Positive and negative images 
had been selected from a pre-rated art database (Kreplin & Fairclough, 2013) of 60 pictures, 
based on ratings for valence and visual complexity. Images in the database were rated by 
1043 participants in an online study design. Participants were asked to provide ratings for 
visual complexity (easy – complex) and valence (positive – negative) on a 9 point scale. 
Mean valence ratings for positive images and negative images used in this study were M = 
3.54 (SD 0.56) and M =6.09 (SD 0.38) respectively. Mean complexity ratings in this study 
were kept at M = 4.35 (SD 0.95). Ratings from the database were only available for identical 
images, because the database did not contain images that were very similar but slightly 
different. Therefore additional images for the different condition were chosen over the 
internet from little known artists that sold or exhibited their work. These were to be similar 
versions of the same painting but with slight though still distinctive differences (see Figure 1 
bottom). We found six such triplet versions which we judged to be of neutral valence but 
similar complexity than the images in the other conditions. To verify these parameters, fifteen 
new participants (8 female, age M = 30.71, SD 3.45) rated images in the different condition 
for complexity and valence on 9-point Likert scales. The mean valence ratings were M = 5.01 
(SD 1.67). The complexity ratings showed that images in the different condition (M = 4.31, 
SD 1.82) are not seen as more complex than those in the identical condition (M = 4.35, SD 
0.95; t(7) = 1.19, p = .272) and neutral in valence. To confirm differences in valence ratings 
between conditions, a one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of valence (F(2,10) = 
                                                          
1
 As the main researcher and first author moved to a different University where the eye-tracking equipment 
was not available she was unable to examine eye movements in all participants. However, it was felt that 
the sample of 22 participants was sufficient to accurately establish patterns of eye movements during the 
selection task. 
  8 
 
 
 
63,60, p = .001, η2=0.927). Paired sample t-tests showed that images in the negative 
identical condition were rated as significantly more negative than images in the positive 
identical condition (t(7) = 33.73, p = .001), and images in the different condition 
significantly less positive than images in the positive identical condition (t(5) = 5.87, p = 
.002) and less negative than images in the negative identical condition (t(5) = 4.52, p = .006). 
The different condition was included to assess if the CSE would only be present in identical 
images or if it would also occur if the images were slightly different. This design allowed a 
comparison between decision-making that is based on a combination of heuristics and image 
differences. 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli for a) positive identical: “Magic Realism” ©Michael Parkes. b) 
negative identical: Monika Weiss “Elytron” 2003, self-shot photography, performance, 
installation, sculpture and video. Courtesy the artist and Chelsea Art Museum, New York and 
c) different: Cornelius Voelker “Raspberry”, 2008, oil on canvas, 11.8 x 13.8 inch (© VG 
Bild-Kunst). 
 
2.3. Procedure 
To record the eye tracking data participants (N = 22) were seated in front of an ASL6000 
Remote Eye tracking system (Applied Science Group, Inc.). The ASL504 eye-tracker screen 
was 44cm with a spatial resolution of more than 0.5 degrees, a spatial error less than 1 degree 
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and a sampling rate of 60Hz. The remote eye tracker was placed in front of the participant 
just below the screen. The camera tracked participants’ eye movements throughout the 
experiment in an unobtrusive manner. Participants were asked to place their chin into a head-
rest to minimize head movement. The eye-tracking device was calibrated for each participant 
immediately before the experiment started. The process required participants to look at a 
series of yellow numbered dots presented on a blue screen.  
 
Participants were seated at a distance of 70 cm from the screen. Each trial consisted of one 
image set that showed three images simultaneously. Each image had a dimension of at least 
300 x 240 pixels, and a maximum of 300 x 350 pixels, image sizes varied slightly depending 
on the original layout of the picture (landscape or portrait). Instructions on the screen asked 
participants to inspect the displayed images and to give a preference judgment (“Which 
image do you prefer?”) by pressing the keyboard keys “v” (to select the left image), “b” 
(centre image), or “n” (right image). The next triplet of images would appear after a response 
(using keys v, b, n) was made with an inter-trial interval of 1000ms during which a blank 
screen was shown. Viewing time was not constricted. Twenty-two image sets were shown; 
six image sets in the different picture condition2, eight image-sets in the negative identical 
condition and eight in the positive identical condition. Participants were not informed about 
the nature of the three conditions, however, all participants commented after the experiment 
on the fact that some images were identical. The image sets were presented in random order 
using e-prime 2.0. The location (left, centre, right) of each image within sets for the different 
picture condition was counterbalanced across participants. This was not necessary for the 
negative and positive identical condition because the images were the identical. Participants 
were informed that the experiment concerned decision-making in the context of art, but not 
about the effect of location on preference until completion of the experiment until the 
debriefing. 
 
2.4. Data extraction (eye tracking) 
To analyse the data, three identical Regions of Interest (ROI) were identified using Eyenal 
analysis software (Applied Science Group, Inc.). A ROI identified the area in which 
subsequent looking behaviour was analysed. ROIs covered 300 x 350 pixels (covering one 
image) and were defined as left, centre and right. Eyenal was used to extract looking 
behaviour for each ROI. A fixation was defined as a short pause within the scanning of the 
item in each ROI. Fixations shorter than 100ms were excluded from further analysis. The 
number of the first fixation of each trial (the count of the first fixation of each trial), the 
number of the last fixation within each trial (the count of the last fixation in each trial), the 
percentage of the total fixation count (how many fixations each location received in relation 
to all fixations of one trial) and the percentage of the total fixation duration (the amount of 
time each location was fixated on within a trial in relation to the whole time of the trial) was 
extracted and exported to Excel and SPSS for further analysis. Using the percentage of 
                                                          
2
 For the different condition only six different image variations were available that would be comparable in 
amount and style of changing a particular motif (rather than the eight triplets in each of the two identical 
sets). 
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fixation takes into account time that is lost because of eye blinks or fixations outside ROIs 
(Glaholt et al., 2009).  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioural Analysis 
Non-parametric tests were employed as is customary with these types of data (Atalay et al., 
2012; Rodway et al., 2011) as assumptions for parametric analyses cannot be upheld for 
preference counts. Three Friedman ANOVAs were computed to identify if there was a CSE 
in any of the three conditions (i.e. preference differences between left, centre and right 
location were compared in each condition) for N = 50. The Friedman ANOVAs yielded a 
significant effect for preference between locations for the positive identical condition (χ2 
(2,50) = 9.76, p = .008), but not for the different condition (χ2 (2,50) =0.748, p = .678) or the 
negative identical condition (χ2 (2,50) = 0.838, p = .658). Post-hoc analyses for the positive 
identical condition using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests showed that the centre location (M= 
3.50, SD 2.09) was preferred significantly more often than the left location (M = 2.34, SD 
1.66; z = -2.05, p = .040) and the right location (M = 2.16, SD 1.53; z = -2.52, p = .012). In 
other words, there was a CSE for the positive identical condition but not the negative 
identical condition or the different condition. 
 
To establish if there was an interaction in preference ratings between conditions and location 
three Friedman ANOVAs were computed to identify differences between conditions at each 
location (i.e. comparing differences between conditions at the left, centre and right location). 
To be able to do this, the data set of the positive identical and negative identical condition 
was reduced by omitting trials with the two least positive and the two least negative images 
which left six images in the positive identical condition and six images in the negative 
identical condition. This step was performed to assure that each condition contained an equal 
number of images (to match the 6 trials in the ‘different’ condition). Further, it enabled us to 
investigate whether a possible difference for central preference was masked by an 
underpowered manipulation of valence. Firstly the Friedman ANOVAs for the positive 
identical and negative identical condition were repeated. The results showed a significant 
effect for preference between locations for the positive identical condition (χ2 (2,50) = 6.42, p 
= .040), but not the negative identical condition (χ2 (2,50) = 0.04, p = .977). Post-hoc 
analyses for the positive identical condition using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests showed that 
the centre location (M= 3.08, SD 1.95) was preferred significantly more often than the right 
location (M = 1.88, SD 1.36; z = -2.45, p = .014) and, approaching significance, the left 
location (M = 2.04, SD 1.49; z = -1.86, p = .062).  
 
. The Friedman ANOVAs  conducted to establish between condition effects at each location 
(i.e. comparing differences between conditions at the left, centre and right location) yielded a 
significant difference between conditions at the centre location (χ2 (2,50) = 15.38, p = .001) 
but not the left (χ2 (2,50) = 1.98, p = .370) or right location (χ2 (2,50) = 0.54, p = .763). The 
results showed that images in the positive identical condition (M = 3.08, SD 1.95) were 
preferred significantly more in the centre location compared to images in the negative 
identical condition (M = 2.26, SD 1.72, z = 2.98, p = .003) and different condition (M = 
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1.82, SD 1.15, z = 3.23, p = .001). In other words, images in the positive identical condition 
were preferred significantly more often in the centre location compared to images in the 
negative identical and different condition indicating that valence influences preference at the 
centre location. Figure 2 displays these results. An additional 3 (condition) by 3 (location) 
analysis of variance was conducted on the median response times. Missing data were 
replaced by using the SPSS function ‘linear trend at point’. There were no main effects or 
interactions, all Fs = 1.52. The median response time across all conditions was M = 4.89 
seconds (SD = 0.485). 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage preferred at each location for the three conditions (N = 50) with standard 
errors. 
 
To examine whether the subset of 19 participants, who completed the eye-tracking task, 
showed patterns of preferences similar to the whole sample, a final set of analyses were 
conducted on their behavioural data. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were performed between 
locations for images in the positive identical condition to establish if the CSE remained, and 
between conditions for the centre location to establish if this again indicated an interaction 
between condition and location. Results for the comparison of location in the positive 
identical condition showed a trend for a CSE, i.e. images in the centre (M = 3.98, SD 2.65) 
were preferred more often than images on the left (M = 2.11, SD 2.05; z = -1.66, p = .096) or 
right (M = 2.00, SD 1.81; z = -1.73, p = .083). Results showed that images in the different 
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condition (M = 1.78, SD 1.26) were preferred less often in the centre location compared to 
images in the positive (M = 3.98, SD 2.65; z = -2.46, p = .014) and negative (M = 3.44, SD 
2.65; z = -2.58, p = .010) identical conditions. No difference was found between images in 
the positive identical and negative identical condition (z = -0.97, p = .330). Thus overall the 
pattern of preferences was very similar to the whole sample. 
 
3.2. Eye-tracking Analysis 
SPSS 20.0 was used to compute five one-way repeated measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) with three levels (left/centre/right) for each condition (different pictures, negative 
identical pictures, positive identical pictures). Bonferroni corrected significance levels are 
reported. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied where necessary.  
 
3.2.1. Different Pictures 
ANOVAs for the eye tracking data showed a significant difference between locations for first 
fixations (first fixation) (F(2,34) = 18.32, p = .001, η2=0.51), the fixation duration (fixation 
duration %) (F(2,34) = 6.8, p = .001, η2=0.28), and the percentage of the fixation count 
(fixation count %) (F(2,34) = 7.06, p = .001, η2=0.29). No significant difference was found 
for the last fixations (Table 1). Paired samples t-tests showed that pictures presented in the 
centre were fixated on significantly more often first (first fixation) than images on the left 
(t(17) =2.13 , p = .04) and right (t(17) = 7.55, p = .001). Participants spent significantly less 
time (fixation count %) on images presented to the right compared to the left (t(17) = 2.7, p = 
.01) or centre (t(17) = 5.17, p = .001).  
 
Table 1. Mean preference score and eye tracking data (with standard deviations) for pictures 
in the different picture condition (N = 19).  
 
Left Centre Right 
Preference Score 2.00 (1.13) 1.78 (1.26) 2.22 (1.62) 
First Fixation 2.00 (1.68) 3.78 (1.89 0.11 (0.47) 
Last Fixation 2.28 (1.48) 2.00 (1.23) 1.56 (1.29) 
Fixation Count 1.67 (0.64) 5.39 (2.58) 1.30 (0.71) 
(Fix Count %) 32.78 (10.74) 34.17 (8.98) 21.79 (8.99) 
Fixation Duration 1.61 (0.78) 1.74 (1.13) 1.04 (0.55) 
(Fixation Duration %) 33.11 (11.96) 34.16 (10.28) 21.94 (8.88) 
Note: Preference score = behavioural data; First fixation = the first fixation of each trial; Last fixation = the 
last fixation within each trial; Fixation Duration = the duration (sec) of how often each participant focused 
on each location within a trial. Fixation Count = how often a participant fixated on each location within a 
trial. The percentage of how often and how long each participant focused on each location within a trial 
in relation to the whole time of the trial are also given (Fixation Count % and Fixation Duration % 
respectively). This takes eye-blinks and fixations outside ROIs into consideration.  
 
3.2.2. Positive Identical Pictures  
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Behavioural and eye tracking data for negative and positive identical condition are 
summarised in Table 1. Eye tracking data for positive identical images showed a significant 
difference between locations for the first fixations (first fixation) (F(2,34) = 11.21, p = .001, 
η2=0.39), the percentage of the fixation duration (fixation duration %) (F(2,34) = 9.07, p = 
.001, η2=0.34), and the percentage of the fixation count (fixation count %) (F(2,34) = 12.79, 
p = .001, η2=0.42). Pair-wise comparisons showed that participants fixated first more 
frequently on the centre picture compared to the right picture (t(17) = 6.47, p = .001) and 
more frequently on the centre picture compared to the left picture (t(17) = 4.27, p = .001). 
Overall participants spent comparatively less time (fixation duration %) looking at pictures 
located on the right compared to left (t(17) = 2.57, p = .021) and centre (t(17) = 7.06, p = 
.001).The percentage of fixation on each location (fixation count %) indicated that 
participants spent proportionally more time fixating on centre images compared to the right 
(t(17) = 8.05, p = .001), but that the difference between pictures displayed on the centre and 
the left, although approaching significance did not reach it (p = .082; see Table 2). No 
differences were found for the last fixations. 
 
3.2.3. Negative Identical Pictures 
Eye tracking data for negative identical pictures showed a significant difference between 
locations for the first fixations (first fixation) (F(2,34) = 19.57, p = .001, η2=0.53), the 
percentage of the fixation duration (fixation duration %) (F(2,34) = 8.48, p = .001, η2=0.33) 
and the percentage of the fixation count (fixation count %) (F(2,34) = 10.43, p = .001, 
η2=0.38). No difference was found for the last fixations. Paired comparison showed that 
pictures displayed on the right received significantly less first fixations than pictures 
displayed in the centre (t(17) = 8.19, p = .001) or left (t(17) = 5.45, p = .001). A trend was 
identified where pictures in the centre received more first fixations than pictures located to 
the left (p = .073). The mean scores for the percentage of the fixation duration (fixation 
duration %) and the percentage of the fixation count (fixation count %) indicate that 
participants fixated more often on, and spent more time looking at the pictures located in the 
centre. Paired comparisons showed that pictures displayed in the centre were looked at more 
(fixation duration %) than pictures presented to the right (t(17) = 5.13, p = .001). Pictures 
displayed in the centre were also more often fixated on (fixation count %) than pictures 
displayed to the right (t(17) = 6.58, p = .001). No significant differences between how often 
(fixation count%) and how long for participants spent looking at pictures (fixation duration%) 
located in the centre and left location (Table 2) was observed.  
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Table 2. Mean preference for each location and mean values of the eye tracking data (with 
standard deviations) for pictures in the positive identical and negative identical condition (N 
= 19).  
 
  Positive     Negative   
 
Left Centre Right Left Centre Right 
Preference Score 
2.11 
(2.05) 
3.89 
(2.65) 
2.00 
(1.18) 
2.06 
(1.89) 
3.44 
(2.35) 
2.50 
(1.91) 
First Fixation 
3.17 
(2.74) 
4.50 
(2.74) 
0.22 
(0.54) 
2.94 
(2.20) 
4.83 
(2.33) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
Last Fixation 
2.89 
(1.71) 
3.00 
(1.94) 
2.06 
(1.16) 
2.89 
(1.71) 
3.11 
(1.60) 
1.89 
(1.19) 
Fixation Count 
1.65 
(0.63) 
4.90 
(2.25) 
1.52 
(0.76) 
1.60 
(0.72) 
4.66 
(2.15) 
1.46 
(0.93) 
(Fixation Count %) 
30.05 
(6.48) 
35.06 
(6.48) 
23.07 
(7.31) 
31.13 
(7.97) 
35.41 
(8.2) 
22.29 
(7.5) 
Fixation Duration 
1.46 
(0.78) 
1.51 
(0.71) 
1.03 
(0.65) 
1.42 
(0.75) 
1.61 
(0.83) 
1.07 
(0.77) 
(Fixation Duration 
%) 
31.08 
(7.65) 
34.09 
(6.79) 
23.03 
(0.95) 
31.92 
(8.02) 
35.40 
(8.65) 
22.71 
(8.5) 
Note: Preference score = behavioural data; First fixation = the first fixation of each trial; Last fixation = the 
last fixation within each trial; Fixation Duration = the duration (sec) of how often each participant focused 
on each location within a trial. Fixation Count = how often a participant fixated on each location within a 
trial. The percentage of how often and how long each participant focused on each location within a trial in 
relation to the whole time of the trial are also given (Fixation Count % and Fixation Duration % 
respectively). This takes eye-blinks and fixations outside ROIs into consideration.  
The results showed overall that the first fixations were predominantly directed to the centre 
location in all three conditions. The fixation count (fixation count %) indicated that the right 
location was fixated on least often in all three conditions. No difference was found between 
the amount of fixation (fixation count %) between the left and centre position in the different 
picture condition and the negative picture condition; a trend was identified for the positive 
picture condition with more fixations on the centre position than the left. No reliable 
difference was found for the amount of time (fixation duration %) participants spent looking 
at each location in the different picture condition. Participants fixated for longer on the left 
and centre location compared to the right location in the positive and negative identical 
condition (see Table 2).  
 
3.2.4. Regression Analysis 
Separate multiple regression analyses were used for each condition to assess whether eye-
movements predict the preference score at the centre location. The dependent variable was 
the behavioural preference score and the predictors were entered using the enter method. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, multicolinearity and homoscedasticity. Outliers (defined as 3 SD above/below the 
mean) were excluded. The fixation count (%) and fixation duration (%) showed a tolerance 
level below .10 indicating a high co-dependency between these two measures. It was decided 
to exclude fixation count (%) from the regression analysis because fixation duration is the 
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more prominent measure in preference studies using eye tracking (e.g. Glaholt & Reingold, 
2011; Shimojo et al., 2003). The regression model consisted therefore of dependent variable 
‘preference score’ and the predictors: first fixation, last fixation and fixation duration (%). 
  
The total variance explained by the model for the different picture condition was 51% 
(F(3,16) = 4.51, p = .022). The predictor fixation duration (%) (beta = 0.68) significantly 
predicted preference. The first fixation and last fixation did not reach significance in the final 
model (Table 3). The total variance for the model for the positive identical picture condition 
was 49% (F(3,16) = 4.27, p = .026). The predictor last fixation (beta = 0.51) significantly 
predicted preference. The first fixation and the fixation duration did not significantly predict 
preference choices. The model for the negative identical picture condition was not significant 
(F(3,16) = 0.80, p = .849). In summary, preference choices in the different conditions were 
predicted by how long a location was fixated, and positive conditions were predicted by 
participants’ last fixation.  
 
Table 3. Regression analysis for the centre location for the different condition and the 
positive and negative identical conditions (N = 19).  
 
 
Different Picture  
Cond. 
Positive Identical Picture 
Cond. 
Negative Identical Picture 
Cond. 
Predictor B 
SE 
B 
β 
Sign. 
B SE B β Sign. B 
SE 
B 
β Sign. 
First Fixation 
-
0.11 
0.13 
-
0.17 
ns 0.42 0.22 0.39 ns 
-
0.10 
0.21 
-
0.10 ns 
Last Fixation 0.10 0.23 0.09 ns 0.67 0.28 0.51 0.03 
-
0.28 
0.33 
-
0.22 ns 
Fixation 
Duration 
0.08 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.15 ns 0.02 0.58 0.09 
ns 
Note: Dependent variable = preference score; Different picture condition R2 = .64; Positive identical 
picture condition R2 = .51; Negative identical; picture condition R2 = .05;  SE B = Standard Error 
Beta  
 
4. Discussion 
When participants were presented with three works of art arranged in a line, and asked to 
select the artwork they preferred, the location of the artwork influenced choice. The effect of 
middle location depended on both the valence of the artwork and whether the artworks were 
identical or merely similar. As was expected from previous research (Rodway et al., 2012), 
when the three artworks were identical and had positive valence, participants showed a 
preference for the artwork in the middle, i.e. there was a CSE. No reliable preference for the 
middle artwork was obtained when the artworks were similar but not identical, or when the 
artworks were identical but of negative valence. These findings are important in delineating 
the circumstances in which the preference for a middle item emerges. 
 
The CSE has been demonstrated by several studies and the preference for the middle artwork 
(when the three artworks were identical and positive) was in line with expectations. The 
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finding of a CSE for positive but not negative valence conditions therefore helps to 
discriminate between the competing explanations of the CSE. For example, the effect of 
valence on the CSE cannot be explained by the minimal mental effort account  (Christenfeld, 
1995), or attentional account (Shaw et al., 2000) of the CSE, as both explanations would 
predict that a middle preference will emerge equally for both the positive and negative works 
of art. From the perspective of an attentional explanation it could be suggested that the reason 
why the central preference was not present for the negative artworks is that they received less 
exposure, because their negative valence caused participants to reduce gaze allocation to 
these artworks. However, there was no evidence for this in the eye movement data, with 
equivalent gaze patterns and decision times for the negative and positive artworks. 
 
The absence of a CSE for negatively valenced artworks can be explained by the CS heuristic, 
as described by Valenzuela and Rahugbir (2009), which proposes that people hold the belief 
that the best items are in the centre. Clearly, a necessary aspect of the CS heuristic is also the 
belief that the worst items do not belong in the centre (see Rahugbir & Valenzuela, 2006; 
Study 1)  and as a consequence a central item may not be preferred if it has negative valence. 
This result is also in agreement with Rodway et al. (2012) who found that when participants 
were asked to select the item they ‘least preferred’ (from a row of similar items) the centre-
stage effect was eliminated. The modulation of the CSE by emotional valence obtained in this 
study therefore questions an attentional explanation of the CSE and is in agreement with the 
CS heuristic, suggesting that cognitive factors determine the emergence of the CSE. 
 
One aim of this study was to examine the generalizability of the CSE by using artworks 
rather than the common-place consumer items that have been used in previous studies. The 
fact that the CSE was obtained when the three artworks were identical and positive suggests 
that the CSE generalizes to non-consumer items that may require more cognitive and 
emotional appraisal. However, the lack of a CSE for similar but non-identical artworks 
complicates this interpretation. This result contrasts with the findings of previous studies 
which have found a middle preference for similar but non-identical items (e.g. Atalay et al., 
2012; Christenfeld, 1995; Shaw et al., 2000; Raghubir & Valenzuela, 2006; Valenzuela & 
Raghubir, 2009; Rodway et al., 2012). Each of these earlier studies used items of little 
intrinsic interest (e.g. vitamin containers, packets of chewing gum, pens, and pairs of socks), 
and it has been suggested that when decisions are of minor importance people use minimal 
mental effort (Christenfeld, 1995), and if no other information is available to discriminate 
between the options people base their decision on the heuristic that the best things are located 
in the middle (Bar Hillel, 2011; Rahugbir & Valenzuela, 2006). In the present study it is 
possible that the use of non-identical artworks caused participants to consider their preference 
decision more carefully by looking at the particular aesthetic attributes of each item, resulting 
in the qualities of the art determining preference rather than the location of the art. Indeed, the 
regression of eye tracking indices on preference choices in this condition showed that fixation 
durations correlated with preference choice (across the three locations), indicating appraisals 
depending on individual stimuli. However, when the artworks were identical (and positive) 
the only difference was their location and aesthetic differences between the options were no 
longer a factor in the choice, which may have resulted in location determining choice. This 
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interpretation requires further experimentation but our results clearly indicate that it would be 
imprudent to conclude that the CSE obtained with every-day consumer items generalises to 
items that may elicit a range of cognitive and emotional responses during their appraisal, such 
as three similar but different works of art. 
 
The CSE was present only for the identical positive artworks but the analysis of eye 
movements for the three conditions showed similar gaze patterns with relatively minor 
differences. A consistent pattern was that participants tended to allocate gaze more to the 
central artwork and left artwork, than the right artwork. This was present for both the 
negative and positively valenced art, with significantly more first fixations and longer 
fixations made to the left and central artwork, compared to the right artwork. Moreover, when 
the three artworks were similar but different, gaze was allocated to the central and left 
artwork for longer than the right artwork. This pattern may have reflected a left-to-right 
scanning strategy acquired from reading (see Megreya & Harvard, 2011). These significant 
differences in the allocation of gaze to the artworks were not matched by equivalent 
differences in the preference choices of participants. Moreover, the significant CSE for the 
positive artworks, but not the negative and non-identical artworks, was not mirrored by 
equivalent differences in the eye movement data between the different conditions.  
 
In replication of Atalay et al.’s (2012) findings, when the artworks were similar but not 
identical, participant’s first fixations were more frequently allocated to the central artwork, 
but this initial allocation of attention did not predict choice of the central item. The fact that 
first fixations, and number of fixations, were not related to preferences is important as it 
strengthens the view that initial exposure, the central fixation bias, and greater attention to the 
central item (e.g. Shaw et al., 2000), do not underlie the preference for the middle item. 
Several studies have shown that the primary relationship between choice and eye movements 
is reflected as an increase in fixations on the preferred choice in the final few seconds before 
the choice is emitted (Atalay et al., 2012; Shimojo et al., 2003). Regression analyses of the 
data found that the last fixation predicted preference for the central item when the artworks 
were identical and positive, but not for negatively valenced identical artworks, or when they 
were non-identical. In fact, when different paintings were considered, the duration of 
fixations were a predictor of choice (across the three locations). These results therefore 
partially replicate those of Atalay et al. (2012) but extend them to show that the relationship 
between the last fixation and central preference can depend on the valence of the items and if 
they are identical or not. This finding is in agreement with the behavioural results and points 
to the importance of item valence in influencing both preference choices and gaze allocation. 
 
Based on our findings we suggest that the CS heuristic, which specifies that the best items are 
in the middle (Rahugbir & Valenzuela, 2006), is the most convincing explanation of the 
middle preference. As described previously, Valenzuela and Rahugbir (2009) reached this 
conclusion from a range of evidence showing that people’s metacognitive beliefs about 
position (rather than attention to an item) determined their location-based preferences.  In 
contrast to Valenzuela and Rahugbir’s (2009) interpretation, Atalay et al. (2012) concluded 
from their experiments that attention, and not inferences, played an important role in causing 
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the middle preference. Atalay et al. (2012) concluded this for a number of reasons including 
the fact that gaze was allocated to the central item in the last few seconds before a choice. 
They explained the link between the middle preference and central gaze allocation in terms of 
a central Gaze Cascade effect with gaze and preference operating additively, so that greater 
gaze to the middle item increases liking, which further increases gaze and the selection of the 
middle item. In addition, while it was found that participants held the belief that “On the 
supermarket shelf, I believe that most popular products are placed always in the middle”, 
holding this ‘popularity’ belief did not correlate significantly with the proportion of fixations 
on the central brand. Finally, Atalay et al. (2012) measured inferences about particular brands 
(e.g. popularity, attractiveness, quality) but did not find them to be related to the middle 
preference. Consequently it was concluded that the middle preference was due to a central 
gaze cascade effect and not location-based inferences. 
 
There are, however, several reasons why Atalay et al. (2012) might not have found a 
relationship between inferences and location-based preferences. First, correlating the belief 
that popular products are in the centre with fixations on the central item is not the most direct 
way of examining whether the ‘popularity’ belief influences choice. It would have been more 
informative to correlate the ‘popularity’ belief with the actual extent that the middle item was 
chosen. Second, the other inferences Atalay et al. (2012) measured were about a particular 
brand rather than about the specific instances of that brand at a particular location. For 
example, each brand used by Atalay et al. (2012) had three instances and rather than asking 
participants their inferences about each instance of a brand in a location, participants were 
asked about the brand in general. This procedure was implemented to reduce the burden on 
participants but this method could have weakened any link between inferences, choice and 
location, preventing the detection of a possible relationship.  Furthermore, in Atalay et al.’s 
(2012) study a preference for the middle item always emerged which meant that eye 
movements could not be compared across conditions where there was, or was not, a 
preference for the middle. It is possible that similar gaze patterns would have been obtained 
when the middle item was not chosen, as was the case in our study. This would have 
demonstrated that eye movements and behavioural preferences dissociate and may have led 
to a different conclusion about the underlying causes (see also Bird et al., 2012). Finally, it 
has also been found that the gradual increase in fixations on items that are subsequently 
chosen can also occur for disliked items, and items that are brighter, and not only for 
preferred items (Nittono & Wada, 2009). Given that the CSE effect occurs for items that are 
‘preferred’ rather than ‘not-preferred’ (Rodway et al., 2012), the findings of Nittono and 
Wada (2009) also suggest that gaze allocation is not closely related to the CSE3. 
 
Our findings do not contradict the interrelated nature of gaze allocation and choice that has 
been demonstrated previously (e.g. Atalay et al., 2012; Chandon et al, 2007; Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2009), but they suggest that location-based preferences are influenced by cognitive 
factors that specify rules about the attributes of the stimulus in a location (see also Orquin & 
Loose, 2013). Future studies have to corroborate our finding of a preference difference 
                                                          
3
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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between positive and negative items and a possible relationship to the item’s complexity, but 
it appears that the middle preference only emerges when a stimulus condition fulfils certain 
preconditions about what belongs in the centre, irrespective of the participant’s eye 
movements4. Thus, we propose that decision heuristics have a superordinate role in 
determining the middle preference, and although the last fixation predicted central choice for 
positively valenced artworks, this is as likely to be a reflection of the choice decision as it is 
the cause of the preference, or the end point of a gaze cascade.  
 
One potential caveat with our study is that eye tracking was measured in a sub-set of 
participants and it is possible that a clearer relationship between gaze allocation and 
preferences would have been obtained if the eye movements of all participants had been 
measured. However, as noted in the methods section, participants behavioural data did not 
differ in the sub-set, suggesting that all participants behaved similarly. Furthermore, eye 
movements were measured for all trials, providing repeated measures of gaze allocation for 
each condition, whereas in Atalay et al.’s (2012) study eye movements were recorded for one 
choice trial only.  This may have made the measure of gaze allocation more accurate and 
robust in this study, and probably a more valid reflection of consumer choice situations. 
Finally, the behavioural results of this study are important in their own right by 
demonstrating that item valence influences the emergence of the CSE and may supersede any 
effect of gaze allocation.  
 
To summarise, the findings have important implications for predicting preference behaviour 
and understanding the cause of the CSE. A central preference cannot be assumed to occur 
automatically, as it is mediated by other information such as the attributes of the items, 
including their valence and particular aesthetic qualities. The measurement of eye movements 
replicated previous findings showing that the CSE is not caused by initial attention, the 
central fixation bias, or the amount of gaze directed at the central item (Atalay et al., 2012). 
Importantly it was found and that for positively valenced artworks the final fixation predicted 
choice of the central item. This impact of valence on the CSE is incompatible with a minimal 
mental effort, or mere bottom-up attentional account of the CSE. Rather, in accord with 
Valenzuela and Rahugbir’s (2009) original interpretation, the findings can be explained by 
the centre-stage heuristic directing choice behaviour. We suggest this decision heuristic 
determines location-based choices, with behavioural choices and the final fixation reflecting 
the belief that the best items belong in the centre.  
                                                          
4
 Preconditions that must be present in the environment for heuristics to work – and therefore to be employed 
– are also stipulated for other types of heuristics, e.g. the Recognition Heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002). 
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